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In bankruptcy laws, proportionality is the universal norm when allocating the liquidation value of
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1 Introduction
Bankruptcy is a central economic issue with important consequences.1 As a result, pro-
cedures on the liquidation of a bankrupt firm and its allocation among creditors exist in
bankruptcy laws of every country.2 One common feature of bankruptcy regulations around
the world is that the value of a liquidated firm is allocated in proportion to the claims of
the creditors.3
The theoretical literature following the seminal work of O’Neill (1982) focused on (ax-
iomatic) evaluation of solutions to bankruptcy problems, with the intention of producing
“desirable” proposals. Additional to the proportionality principle, which characterizes the
real-life bankruptcy regulations mentioned in the previous paragraph, this literature pro-
duced two other central principles. The equal awards principle requires equalizing the
amount each creditor receives after bankruptcy and the equal losses principle requires
equalizing the losses the creditors incur. The following example demonstrates differences
between the three.
Example 1 Suppose there are two creditors who respectively invest 1000 and 2000 USD
in a firm that goes bankrupt. Assume that the liquidation value of the bankrupt firm
is 1800 USD. For this bankruptcy problem, the proportionality principle suggests that the
agents’ shares be proportional to their original investments, that is, proposes the allocation
xP = (600, 1200). The equal awards principle suggests dividing the firm’s liquidation value
equally among the creditors, that is, proposes the allocation xEA = (900, 900). Finally,
the equal losses principle suggests dividing the firm’s loss in value (i.e. 3000-1800=1200
USD) equally among the creditors, that is, proposes the allocation xEL = (400, 1400).
The axiomatic literature on bankruptcy problems studies an abundance of allocation rules,
almost every one of which is based on one or more of these three principles. Among them,
some are purely based on one principle (such as the Proportional, Constrained Equal
Awards, Piniles, or Constrained Equal Losses rules) and some apply different principles
on different problems (such as the Talmud, the ICI family, or the Parametric family of
rules).4 However, neither the axiomatic literature, nor the more applied corporate finance
literature on bankruptcy (discussed in the next section) does address the question of why
in actual practice the proportionality principle has been preferred over the other two
alternatives, or to any mixed application of these three principles. The answer might lie
in the fact that the three principles are very different in terms of how they incentivize the
1For example, in US between 1999 and 2009, more than 551000 firms filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and
more than 22.16 billion USD were allocated in these cases (see http://www.justice.gov/ust/index.htm).
2For examples, see Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or the Receivership code in U.K. In
some countries such as Sweden or Finland, these procedures provide the only option for the resolution
of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy laws of some other countries, such as U.S., also offer procedures (such as
Chapter 11) for reorganization of the bankrupt firm.
3More precisely, the creditors are sorted by law into different priority groups (such as secured creditors
or unsecured creditors). These groups are served sequentially. That is, a creditor is not awarded a share
until creditors in higher priority groups are fully reimbursed. Second, in each priority group, the shares
of the creditors are determined in proportion to their claims. Proportionality is a very old and common
practice, referred to as a pari passu distribution; the term meaning “proportionally, at an equal pace,
without preference” (see Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004).
4For a formal description of these rules, please see Thomson (2003 and 2008). As an example, consider
the celebrated Talmud rule. If the bankrupt firm’s liquidation value is less than half of its total debt, the
Talmud rule applies the equal awards principle. Otherwise, the equal losses principle is applied.
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creditors and affect their investment behavior.
When comparing the incentives induced by these principles, it is useful to first note that
(in case of bankruptcy) the proportionality principle offers all creditors the same rate of
return on investment. On the other hand, the other two principles distinguish among
bigger and smaller creditors (that is, creditors with higher or lower than the average
investment). The equal losses principle favors bigger creditors by offering them a higher
rate of return than does proportionality (and discriminates against smaller creditors by
offering them a lower return than does proportionality). And the equal awards principle
does the opposite.5
In an environment where investment is endogenous, one would thus intuit that, in com-
parison to proportionality, the equal losses principle provides incentives to increase in-
vestment to receive better treatment as a big creditor while the incentives created by the
equal awards principle is just the opposite. Motivated by this intuition, Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs
(2013) analyzes a noncooperative investment game with possible bankruptcy to compare
alternative allocation rules in terms of how they affect equilibrium investment decisions.
As detailed in Section 3, this study shows that a change in the underlying bankruptcy
principle affects the equilibrium investment of a creditor through (i) a direct effect on her
marginal return on investment (in line with the above intuition), as well as (ii) an indirect
effect through other creditors’ choices (which the initial intuition does not account for
and which can possibly counteract the first effect). Interestingly, Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013)
shows that when investment is aggregated across creditors, the direct effect dominates
the indirect one. Thus, (a) switching from proportionality to equal losses increases total
equilibrium investment, and (b) switching from proportionality to equal awards decreases
total equilibrium investment. This theoretical conclusion, if it can be confirmed by exper-
imental studies, provides a social planner with a strong policy tool to affect investment
behavior.
The objective of this paper is to analyze in an experimental setting the implications of
replacing the proportionality principle in bankruptcy laws with the equal losses and equal
awards principles. Motivated by the previous paragraph, we are particularly interested in
seeing if this institutional change impacts upon the total investment of creditors in ways
consistent with the theoretical results from which we derive our empirical hypotheses
stated below.
Hypothesis 1: Replacing the proportionality principle with equal losses in turn increases
the creditors’ total investment and the amount of increase is independent of the probability
of bankruptcy as long as both principles induce an interior equilibrium.
Hypothesis 2: Replacing the proportionality principle with equal awards in turn de-
creases the creditors’ total investment and the amount of decrease is independent of the
probability of bankruptcy as long as both principles induce an interior equilibrium.
To test these hypotheses as well as two others that are stated below, we construct a simple
experiment with two stages. In the first stage, we use a common technique (due to Holt
and Laury, 2002) to elicit subjects’ risk aversion levels, parameterized as ai. Since in real
life, bankruptcy happens probabilistically, we expect that the probability of bankruptcy
5To see this in the above example, note that the proportionality principle awards both creditors 60% of
their investment. On the other hand, the equal losses principle awards creditor 1, the smaller creditor, only
40% of her investment, but awards the second creditor 70% of her investment. Finally, the equal awards
principle awards creditor 1 90% of her investment, and awards creditor 2, only 45% of her investment.
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as well as the creditors’ risk attitudes will be important determinants of behavior (as
stated in hypotheses 3 and 4 below). In the second stage of the experiment, subjects are
randomly matched into pairs and in each pair, the 2 creditors simultaneously choose how
much money to invest in a firm (say s1 and s2). The total of the two investments determine
the value of the firm (v = s1 + s2). The firm is a lottery which either brings a positive
return (with a probability pi, called hereafter the success probability) or goes bankrupt
(with the remaining probability 1− pi). In the former case, the firm distributes dividends
with an interest r, so creditor i receives (1 + r)si. In the latter case, that is bankruptcy,
only β fraction of the firm’s initial value survives. This value, βv, is allocated among the
creditors according to the pre-specified bankruptcy principle known to the creditors before
they make their investment decisions.
Using the above notation, we can state our next hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Under all three principles, an increase in the probability of bankruptcy
(i.e. a decrease in pi) in turn decreases the creditors’ investment choices.
Hypothesis 4: Under all three principles, an increase in a creditor’s own risk aversion
(i.e. ai) in turn decreases her investment choice.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are intuitive statements that, independent of the underlying bankruptcy
principle, we expect real life creditors facing possible bankruptcy of their investment would
satisfy. They thus serve to check whether our experimental design is a good representation
of real life bankruptcy environments.
Following Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013), the subjects in the experiment move simultaneously
when making investment decisions. However, in the Conclusion, we briefly discuss find-
ings from a numerical analysis that we carried out to see the implications of sequential
interaction.
For reasons that will be discussed in Section 4 (see Footnote 14 and the related paragraph),
we do not provide subjects with information about others’ risk attitudes. Nonetheless, we
present in the Appendix (Subsection 7.4 ) results on additional treatments where we pro-
vide information about others’ risk group (i.e. a set of risk parameters) and show that
this information does not affect investment behavior. The Appendix (Subsection 7.5 ) ad-
ditionally contains an analysis of the determinants of extreme investment behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related literature. In
Section 3, we discuss the Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) model. In Section 4, we present our
experimental design and procedures. In Section 5, we discuss the data produced by the
experiment and we present our statistical analyses and results. We conclude in Section 6.
All supplementary material, including the instructions for the experiment, are presented
in Section 7, the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Being a very important economic issue, bankruptcy has attracted scholarly attention in a
wide variety of fields, the most relevant of which will be discussed next.
Starting with the seminal papers of O’Neill (1982), and Aumann and Maschler (1985), the
axiomatic literature analyzes properties of alternative bankruptcy rules, which are based
on one or more of the three basic principles of proportionality, equal awards, and equal
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losses. It, however, remains silent on their investment implications. Thomson (2003 and
2008) presents a detailed review of this literature, together with an extensive inventory of
the rules analyzed.
The corporate finance literature also contains a large number of papers that study bankruptcy.
Among them, it is particularly useful to mention Hotchkiss et al (2008) which summarizes
bankruptcy laws in different countries, Stromberg (2000) which uses Swedish data to eval-
uate liquidation procedures, and Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) which uses a comprehensive
data set from the US to compare liquidation and reorganization procedures in terms of
costs and efficiency. Even though this literature is extensive, it takes the proportionality
principle as given and does not consider the implications of alternatives.
There is also a game theoretical literature on bankruptcy problems. Aumann and Maschler
(1985), Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987), and Dagan and Volij (1993) relate bankruptcy
rules to cooperative game theoretical solutions. Chun (1989), Dagan, Serrano, and Volij
(1997), Herrero (2003), Gonzalez-Diaz, and Villar (2006), and Chang and Hu (2008)
present noncooperative games that implement different classes of bankruptcy rules. Eraslan
and Yılmaz (2007) and the literature cited therein analyze negotiation games that arise
during reorganization of the bankrupt firm. This literature also remains silent on the
question of how bankruptcy rules affect the creditors’ investment incentives.
Surprisingly, the experimental literature on bankruptcy is rather thin. There are only
a few papers. Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005) studies an environment where subjects bargain
over a resource that falls short of the sum of their claims (as typical in bankruptcy)
and inquires which of the three main principles (proportionality, equal awards, equal
losses) is a better predictor of behavior. This study finds that while the subjects demand
for themselves shares that are consistent with the equal awards principle, their sharing
suggestions for others are consistent with proportionality. Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006) studies
how the differences between the subjects’ claims affect offers, duration, concessions, and
(dis)agreements in negotiations. Herrero, Moreno-Ternero and Ponti (2010) asks subjects
to play three games with different frames. In the games, three group members have claims
over the shrunk value of a project. Each subject declares which of the three principles
she prefers. The experiment is designed so that the allocation according to each principle
favors exactly one of the claimants. This study first analyzes which principle is chosen
under these conditions. Then it analyzes which principle is chosen if the implemented
principle is determined according to the majority rule. It finds that while subjects’ play
converges to the unique equilibrium principle (that is, each player chooses the principle that
favors her), in the majority procedure the proportional principle prevails as a coordination
device. Cappelen et al (2015) generates situations where participants work and accumulate
claims in firms, some of which subsequently go bankrupt. Randomly chosen third-party
arbitrators are then asked to allocate the bankrupt firm’s liquidation value among the
claimants. The paper finds that almost 85% of the arbitrators support proportionality.
Arbitrators also show significant support for the equal losses principle, while the equal
awards principle receives almost no support.
Thus, earlier experimental studies (mentioned above) have all focused on the allocation
stage of bankruptcy and tried to see how good a predictor of demand (or arbitrator)
behavior the three principles of proportionality, equal awards, and equal losses are. We,
on the other hand, do not take these principles as predictor of behavior. But rather, we take
each as a fixed parameter of the environment where a group of creditors interact and we try
to see how the choice of principle affects the agents’ investment choices. Our experiment
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is thus a very simple and stylized version of a real investment environment.
The closest theoretical papers to our experiment are Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) and, to a
lesser extent, Karago¨zog˘lu (2014) both of which use game theoretic models to analyze
investment implications of a class of bankruptcy rules. Since our experimental design is
similar to the game theoretic model of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013), we will next discuss this
paper in more detail.
3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Our experimental design is similar to the theoretical model of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013).
In this section, we summarize the findings of this paper in relation to our hypotheses. For
formal proofs, please see Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013).
The set of creditors is N = {1, ..., n}. The creditors are endowed with Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) utilities on money, ui(x) = −e−aix, and ordered according to their
degrees of risk aversion as a1 ≤ ... ≤ an. Each creditor i invests si ∈ R+ units of wealth
on a risky company. The company has value v =
∑
N si after investments. With success
probability pi ∈ (0, 1), this value brings a return r ∈ (0, 1] and becomes (1 + r)∑N si. In
this case, each creditor i receives a dividend of (1 + r) si. With the remaining probability
(1 − pi), the company goes bankrupt and its value becomes βv where β ∈ (0, 1) is the
fraction that survives bankruptcy. This amount is allocated among the creditors according
to a pre-specified principle.
Among the bankruptcy principles analyzed in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013), the following three
are central. The Proportional Principle (PRO) is defined as follows: for each creditor i,
PROi(s) = βsi, that is, in case of bankruptcy each creditor receives a share proportional to
her investment. The Equal Awards Principle (EA) is defined as EAi(s) =
β
n
∑
N sj , that is,
in case of bankruptcy all creditors receive the same share, independent of their investment
levels. Finally, the Equal Losses Principle (EL) is defined as ELi(s) = si − 1−βn
∑
N sj ,
that is, in case of bankruptcy all creditors lose the same amount (1−βn
∑
N sj) out of their
initial investments.
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) analyzes pure strategies and obtains the following results. Under
PRO, the investment game has a unique dominant strategy equilibrium and no other Nash
equilibria. If returns in case of success outweigh the losses incurred in case of bankruptcy,
all creditors choose in equilibrium a positive investment.6 The investment games under
EA and EL do not admit dominant strategy equilibria. However, they both admit a
unique Nash equilibrium. Under both principles, if returns in case of success outweigh the
losses incurred in case of bankruptcy and if the creditors are not too different from each
other in terms of their risk attitudes, the investment game admits an interior equilibrium
6This condition is formally stated as pir > (1−pi)(1− β). It compares the return on unit investment in
case of success, r, weighted by the probability of success, pi, with the loss incurred on unit investment in
case of bankruptcy, (1−β), weighted by the probability of bankruptcy, (1−pi). The two other bankruptcy
principles also have similar conditions, as will be seen below. Under this condition, the equilibrium
investment of creditor i is
sPROi =
1
ai (r + 1− β) ln
(
pir
(1− pi)(1− β)
)
.
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where all creditors choose a positive investment.7,8
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) finds that a switch from PRO to EL increases marginal return on
investment (by making losses from bankruptcy less sensitive to investment), thus providing
incentive to increase investment. A switch from PRO to EA, on the other hand, has
the opposite effect.9 Equilibrium investment decision of a creditor is determined by a
combination of this direct effect with a secondary indirect effect through other creditors’
investment choices.
Under EL, the creditors’ investment choices are strategic substitutes (that is, the best
response of a creditor is decreasing in the total investment of other creditors). Thus, the
direct and the indirect effect work in opposite directions (and it is possible that the indirect
effect dominates the direct one). When investment is aggregated across creditors, however,
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) shows that the direct effect dominates the indirect one. Thus,
switching from PRO to EL increases total equilibrium investment (Hypothesis 1).
On the other hand, the creditors’ investment choices are strategic complements under
EA (that is, the best response of a creditor is increasing in the total investment of other
creditors). Thus, the direct and the indirect effects work in the same direction. As a
result, a switch from PRO to EA decreases total investment (Hypothesis 2).
In footnotes 6, 7, and 8, we present the equilibrium investment choices under PRO, EL,
and EA. A closer inspection of these expressions reveal that a creditor’s equilibrium invest-
ment is decreasing in the probability of bankruptcy (1−pi) and in her own risk aversion ai.
These observations constitute Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 respectively. Total invest-
ment under PRO, EL, and EA are obtained by aggregating over creditors the individual
investment levels given in footnotes 6, 7, and 8.10 A simple analysis of these expressions
reveal that total-investment differences are independent of the probability of bankruptcy
(1 − pi), as long as both principles induce an interior equilibrium. This observation con-
stitutes the latter parts of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
7For EA, these conditions can be respectively stated as npir > (1− pi)(n− β) and
1
an∑
N
1
aj
≥ rβ
n(1+r−β) .
Then, the equilibrium investment of creditor i is
sEAi =
n (r + 1− β) + βai∑N 1aj
ain (r + 1− β) (r + 1) ln
(
npir
(1− pi) (n− β)
)
.
8For EL, these conditions can be respectively stated as npir > (1− pi)(1− β) and
1
an∑
N
1
aj
≥ (1+r)(1−β)
n(1−β+r) .
Then, the equilibrium investment of creditor i is
sELi =
n (r + 1− β)− (1− β)ai∑N 1aj
ain (r + 1− β) r ln
(
npir
(1− pi)(1− β)
)
.
9More precisely, the marginal loss incurred on unit investment is (1− β) in case of PRO, (1− β)/n in
case of EL, and it is (1− β/n) in case of EA.
10The total investment levels in an interior equilibrium are given by TPRO = (
∑
(1/ai)
r+1−β ) ln(
pir
(1−pi)(1−β) )
under PRO, TEL = (
∑
(1/ai)
r+1−β ) ln(
npir
(1−pi)(1−β) ) under EL, and TEA = (
∑
(1/ai)
r+1−β ) ln(
pir
(1−pi)(1−(β/n)) ) under EA.
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4 Experimental Design and Procedures
The subjects for the experiment were recruited by using posters hanged around the Middle
East Technical University campus. The participants were undergraduate students.11 The
experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 352 subjects
participated and there were 30 sessions in the experiment. Each subject participated
in only one session and sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. For payoffs, we used
tokens, each token being equivalent to 0.01 Turkish Liras (TL). Each subject received 5
TL for participation, and also their winnings from each stage, as described below. On
average, a subject earned 27.19 TL, including the 5 TL participation fee.12
The experiment had two stages. In the first stage of the experiment, we elicited the risk
attitude of each subject by using the Holt and Laury (2002) method. Subjects were offered
ten pairs of lotteries. Each lottery-pair, called a Row, was made up of two lotteries: a less-
risky lottery called Option A and a more risky lottery called Option B. The subjects were
asked to pick one option from each row. In Row 1, (the less-risky lottery) Option A has a
higher expected payoff than (the more-risky lottery) Option B. Hence, only very strong risk
lovers pick Option B in this row. Moving further down in the rows, the expected payoff
difference between the lotteries in Option A and in Option B decreases and eventually
turns negative in Row 5. In Row 10, subjects choose between a sure payoff of 400 tokens
(Option A) and a sure payoff of 770 tokens (Option B). Since Option B offers a higher
payoff in this last row, by then all subjects should have switched from Option A to Option
B.13 The payment for the first stage was determined according to the subject’s lottery
choice in a randomly chosen row. Payoffs from the first stage were only revealed at the
end of the experiment.
The second stage of the experiment replicated an investment environment with possible
bankruptcy, similar to the formal model described in the previous section. As will be
detailed below, subjects were randomly paired and in each pair, the two subjects were
asked how much they wanted to invest in a firm whose value would be the sum of the
two subjects’ investments. The invested firm became successful with a success probability
pi and paid interest r; or it went bankrupt and only a β fraction of its original value
survived. In this latter case, the remaining value of the bankrupt firm was allocated
among the subjects according to a pre-declared principle.
In the second stage we implemented a 3 × 3 design. Namely, we varied the bankruptcy
principle (formally defined as EL, PRO, and EA in the previous section) and the success
probability (pi = 0.3, pi = 0.45, or pi = 0.6). In each session, we alternated between
2 bankruptcy principles. In particular, in 18 sessions we alternated between PRO and
11The average age of the subject group was 21.69 and 47% of the subjects were female. We did not ask
the subjects if they know game theory. However, around 25% of the subject group was from the economics
department. And, by looking at their ages we can predict that at least half of the 25% had an introduction
to game theory in the second part of the intermediate microeconomics course. The remaining 75% of the
subjects are from other departments where no game theory courses are offered.
12At the time of the experiment, 1 USD corresponded to 2.25 TL.
13In this choice task, a consistent subject should switch from Option A to Option B just once. However,
earlier experiments using Holt and Laury’s (2002) method showed that some subjects may go back and
forth between Option A and Option B. To prevent such behavior in our experiment, we asked subjects
the row number at which they wanted to switch from Option A to Option B (called the switching point).
With these monetary payoffs, it is optimal for a risk-neutral subject to have a switching point of 5 (that
is, to switch from Option A to Option B in Row 5). Similarly, it is optimal for a risk-averse (risk-loving)
subject to have a switching point higher (lower) than 5.
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Table 1: Description of Treatments
Success 0.3 0.3 0.45 0.45 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.45 0.45 0.6 0.6
probability
Order EL PRO EL PRO EL PRO EA PRO EA PRO EA PRO
PRO EL PRO EL PRO EL PRO EA PRO EA PRO EA
EL PRO EL PRO EL PRO EA PRO EA PRO EA PRO
PRO EL PRO EL PRO EL PRO EA PRO EA PRO EA
#Sessions 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
# Matching 12 9 6 6 12 9 5 5 6 6 6 6
Groups
#Subjects 48 36 24 24 48 36 20 20 24 24 24 24
EL and in 12 of them, we alternated between PRO and EA. In all sessions we kept the
fraction that survives bankruptcy (chosen β = 0.4) and the return rate in the case of
success (chosen r = 1) constant.
Table 1 lists the different treatments we employed in the sessions we ran. Note that
we define a treatment with a specific success probability and two bankruptcy principles
alternating in a specific order.14
The second stage of each session was organized with a within-subject block design: in
EL-PRO treatments, each subject went through 36 rounds alternating between EL and
PRO every 9 rounds. Similarly, in EA-PRO treatments, subjects went through the same
cycle of 9-round-blocks alternating between EA and PRO. For each success probability
we alternated the order of bankruptcy principles across treatments to check for possible
order effects.15
The sessions were computerized and we typically admitted 12 subjects to each.16 At the
beginning of each session, in order to avoid dependencies between all observations of one
session, participants were divided into matching groups of 4. In a given round, the subjects
interacted in pairs and during the 9 rounds of a given block, each subject was matched
with every other member of this matching group exactly three times. The order of these
matchings were also randomly determined. This procedure was not explicitly stated in
the instructions but the subjects were told that while it is possible to be matched with
the same person in two consecutive rounds, the person they are matched with will likely
be different at each round.
At the beginning of the second stage, the subjects were informed that they would play 4
14The pi = 0.3 and pi = 0.6 treatments under EL-PRO principles were run earlier than the other
treatments and included sessions where we provided part of the subjects with information about the
teammate’s risk attitude. As will be detailed in the Appendix (Subsection 7.3 ), we found that this
information had no significant effect on a subject’s investment decisions. Thus, in latter treatments we did
not provide subjects any information on partner’s risk attitude.
15It is also useful to note that, while each 9-round-block constitutes a repeated game, the theoretical
predictions remain unchanged. Since the investment game has a unique Nash equilibrium under all three
principles, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the corresponding finitely-repeated game is also unique,
and coincides with the stage game’s unique Nash equilibrium.
16The only exception is 2 sessions (both EA-PRO treatments with pi = 0.3) where we had 8 subjects
due to low participation. (Since each matching group was composed of 4 subjects, the number of subjects
in a session could be any multiple of 4.)
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blocks of 9 identical rounds, that is, in total they would play 36 rounds. They were also told
that before each block starts, they would be given information about the game they would
play in that block. The Appendix (Subsection 7.1 ) presents the instructions we used under
the EL, PRO, and EA treatments when pi = 0.6 and when no information about partner
is given.17 The instructions for different success-rate treatments were similar.
At the beginning of each round (of the second stage), a subject was told that both she
and her teammate were given 400 tokens each. Then, each subject had to choose how
many tokens to invest in the team project. Total investment of the two team members
determined the value of their team’s project. Through randomization, this value either
doubled (with probability 0.6, 0.45 or 0.3 in different treatments) or fell to 40% of its
original value. If the project value doubled, a subject’s payoff was twice the amount she
invested (initial investment plus 100% return) plus the amount she did not invest. If the
project value decreased to 40% of its original value, a subject’s payoff was the amount she
did not invest plus the share she received from the bankruptcy principle (EL, PRO, or
EA) used in that treatment.18 At the end of each round, a subject was informed about
(i) the two investment choices (of her and her teammate), (ii) whether the project value
increased or decreased (i.e. the result of the randomization), and (iii) both her and her
teammate’s payoffs in that round. Then, each subject was randomly and anonymously
matched with another subject and the next round started.
At the end of each session, the subjects’ payoffs were calculated from the first and the
second stages. For the second stage, one round for each block (4 rounds in total) was
randomly chosen and the total tokens won for that 4 rounds were given to the subject
as the second stage payoff. In particular, we paid subjects based on a randomly selected
subset of their decisions as well as a show-up fee. In a recent study, Azrieli, Chambers,
and Healy (forthcoming) lay out the conditions under which this payment scheme (called
Random Multiple Problem Selection, RMPS) is incentive compatible.19
When choosing the experiment parameters pi, r, and β, we faced the following difficulty.
Additional to these parameters, the point predictions of the Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013)
model depend on the agents’ risk aversion parameters, which we do not control, but
only observe at the time of the experiment. To be able to test our hypotheses, we thus
chose the parameters pi, r, and β so that for a wide range of risk aversion parameter
combinations, (i) the theoretical model would predict positive investment levels that do
not exceed the subjects’ total endowments (i.e. interior solutions) and (ii) the theoretical
“total investment” predictions under the two principles would be sufficiently different from
each other. This is how pi = 0.45 and pi = 0.6 were chosen. Since our hypotheses (except
the second statements of the first two) are expected to also hold for cases where the Kıbrıs
and Kıbrıs (2013) model does not predict an interior equilibrium, we additionally included
17For the treatments in which we give information about partner’s risk preferences, the subjects addi-
tionally saw the parts that we present in italics in the Appendix (Subsection 7.1 ).
18More specifically, PRO gave 40% of her investment to each subject. EL gave each subject her individual
investment minus 30% of the project value (that is, half of the loss incurred due to bankruptcy). Finally,
EA gave each subject 20% of the project value (that is, half of the value remaining after bankruptcy).
19RMPS is incentive compatible if preferences satisfy a generalized Monotonicity and a generalized no
complementarities at the top (NCaT) assumption. Monotonicity requires that if, in every state of the
world, a set A of lotteries pays in total more than an alternative set B of lotteries, then the decision maker
should prefer A over B. NCaT requires that, given K menus, if we form a bundle by picking an alternative
that the decision maker top ranks in each menu, this bundle is more preferred to every alternative bundle.
Since in the experiments we did not elicit the subjects’ preferences, we cannot check whether they satisfy
these axioms.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Investment
EL-PRO sessions
Success probability EL PRO Pooled
pi = 0.3 221.1 (135.4)
n=1512
194.1 (137.6)
n=1512
207.6 (137.2)
n=3024
pi = 0.45 290.8 (109.4)
n=864
271.8 (118.0)
n=864
281.3 (114.1)
n=1728
pi = 0.6 293.4 (110.9)
n=1512
280.5 (116.8)
n=1512
286.9 (114.0)
n=3024
Pooled over Success probability 264.7 (125.6)
n=3888
245.0 (132.0)
n=3888
254.8 (129.2)
n=7776
EA-PRO sessions
EA PRO Pooled
pi = 0.3 130.5 (119.9)
n=720
165.3 (126.4)
n=720
147.9 (124.4)
n=1440
pi = 0.45 186.4 (144.2)
n=864
216.9 (142.6)
n=864
201.7 (144.2)
n=1728
pi = 0.6 256.4 (134.2)
n=864
289.1 (123.0)
n=864
272.7 (129.7)
n=1728
Pooled over Success probability 194.7 (143.1)
n=2448
227.2 (140.4)
n=2448
210.9 (142.7)
n=4896
Average individual investment with respect to bankruptcy principle and success prob-
ability. Standard errors in parentheses
the parameter pi = 0.3 (under which the theoretical model predicts zero investment under
PRO).20 A final concern when choosing the parameters was simplicity (e.g. r = 1), so as
to minimize potential confusion of subjects.
In the instructions, we used the term “team project” for the firm, “team members” for
the creditors of the firm, “increase and decrease in project value” for the success and
bankruptcy of the firm, “contribution to the team project” for investment in the firm, and
“the sharing scheme” for the bankruptcy principle.
5 Data and results
In Table 2, we summarize the individual investment levels in EL-PRO and EA-PRO ses-
sions respectively, under the different bankruptcy principles and success probabilities. The
20These parameter combinations thus provide us with two additional tests. First, we test whether under
pi = 0.3, PRO is more likely to produce zero total investment. Second, we test whether the difference in
the total investment levels induced by switching from PRO to either EL or EA depends on the value of pi.
The theoretical prediction is that this difference should be the same for pi = 0.45 and pi = 0.6.
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table suggests that, on average, EL yields higher individual investment levels than PRO
under all values of the success probability pi, as well as when the data is pooled over these
three values.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests suggest that, average individual investment in matching groups
is significantly higher under EL compared to PRO when the success probability is pi = 0.3
(p-value = 0.054 and n = 21) and pi = 0.45 (p-value = 0.012 and n = 12). The difference
loses statistical significance when pi = 0.6 (p-value = 0.455 and n = 21).
As can also be seen in Table 2, a higher success probability yields higher investment levels
both under EL and PRO. In particular when we compare success probabilities pi = 0.3
versus pi = 0.6, we observe that investment levels increase by a factor of 1.44 under PRO
and by a factor of 1.33 under EL. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests support this observation and
indicate significantly higher average investment levels for higher success probabilities under
both EL (p-value < 0.01) and PRO (p-value < 0.01) except for the comparison between
pi = 0.45 and pi = 0.60 where the test statistics loses significance at 5%.21
Similar to EL-PRO sessions, mean investment levels under EA and PRO exhibit a sub-
stantial increase with higher success rates. In addition, across all different values of success
rates, PRO is observed to induce higher investment compared to EA.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests lend support for the difference between investment levels under
EA and PRO for success probability pi = 0.6 (p-value = 0.034 and n = 12 ). On the other
hand, the difference is not significant when the success probability pi = 0.45 (p-value =
0.099 and n = 12) or when pi = 0.3 (p-value = 0.169 and n = 10). As for the effect
of success rate on investment behavior, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that investment
levels increase significantly (p-values < 0.01 for both EA and PRO) as success probability
increases with the exception of the comparison between pi = 0.3 and pi = 0.45 where
the increase in investment is not statistically significant at 5% level under either EA or
PRO.
Since the success probability takes more than two values, we also performed a Kruskal-
Wallis test using matching groups as a single unit of observation. Following this test,
we performed multiple pairwise comparisons across success rates using Dunn’s test for
stochastic dominance (p-values were adjusted using Bonferroni corrections). We report
the p-values from these analyses in Table A9 in the Appendix. As can be seen there,
the results are qualitatively identical to those we obtained from the Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests.
We present charts showing how subjects are distributed to different investment levels as
well as the time trend for average individual investment under each bankruptcy principle
and success probability in the Appendix (Subsection 7.2 ).
We continue our statistical analyses with a series of Tobit regressions to test each of the
hypotheses listed in Section 3. Note that, while the first two hypotheses concern total
investment, hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to individual investment levels. Consequently, in
our regression models we match our level of analysis to the hypothesis we are testing
and employ either individual investment or total investment as our dependent variable
accordingly, while controlling for unobserved matching group level factors.
We model individual investment as a linear function of the bankruptcy principle, the
21All of our non-parametric tests are two-sided and use matching group averages, thus erring on the
conservative side when drawing conclusions about significance.
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success probability, as well as a subject’s personal characteristics such as gender,22 level of
risk aversion and number of prior rounds in which she played with the same bankruptcy
principle. Similarly, we model total investment, by which we mean the total investment of
randomly matched pairs in each round, as a linear function of the bankruptcy principle,
the success probability, as well as the gender composition of the pair and their level of
risk aversion. Note that subjects were only allowed to invest nonnegative amounts and
they were also constrained by the total amount of funds (400 tokens) available to them at
each round. Consequently, to model the investment choices of our subjects, we employed
a random effects Tobit regression analysis in which we accounted for unobserved group
level factors with random effects. Here, by group we mean the matching groups of 4. The
random effects model considers the matching group differences as random disturbances
(rather than fixed) drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero.
Hypothesis 1 states that switching from PRO to EL increases total investment. We test
this hypothesis at the matched-pair level with total investment as our dependent variable,
and where unobserved factors at the matching-group are controlled with random effects.
We control for bankruptcy principle, standardized success probability23, familiarity with
the bankruptcy principle measured by the number of times the pair has played with the
principle in place, the first bankruptcy principle they played with, the gender composition
of the pair (both male, both female, mixed), and finally the risk aversion level of the pair
which we measure by the sum of their switching points in the Holt-Laury task. The results
are presented on the left-most column in Table 3. Note that the reported estimates are
marginal effects on the latent variable, which in our case, is uncensored total investment.
The estimated coefficient for the bankruptcy principle indicator shows that switching from
PRO to EL is on average associated with an increase of 42.7 tokens in (uncensored) total
investment.
Hypothesis 1 also states that the total-investment difference between PRO and EL is in-
dependent of the probability of bankruptcy as long as both principles induce an interior
equilibrium. To test this hypothesis, we rerun our model with the inclusion of an interac-
tion variable between the bankruptcy principle and the success probability after limiting
our sample to observations we obtained under pi = 0.45 and pi = 0.6. As noted earlier,
this is because the independence argument follows from Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) which
is silent for the case pi = 0.3 (since in this case, the theoretical prediction is that total
investment under PRO will be zero). The results which we report on the second column of
Table 3 support the hypothesis. We still observe a substantial and significant jump in (un-
censored) investment levels when we move from PRO to EL. Furthermore, the estimated
coefficient for the interaction term between bankruptcy principle and success probability
is statistically insignificant. In other words, the investment difference between the two
bankruptcy principles remains unaffected by the probability of bankruptcy.
22A common finding in the literature is that women make more conservative retirement investments
compared to men (e.g. see Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei, 1997; Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, and Jianakoplos, 1996;
Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner, 1997; Yuh and Hanna, 1997). Moreover, our results indicate that gender is
associated with the likelihood of making extreme (zero or full) investment choices. Thus, we control for
gender in our regression models. Having said that, our main results are robust to the removal of gender
variables.
23To standardize success probability we rescaled the variable to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of 1. Standardization makes it easier to compare success probabilities, and to read and interpret
the results from the regression analyses.
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Table 3: Results on Hypotheses 1 and 2
Results of Random Effects Tobit Regressions on Total Investment
Random effects at the matching group level EL vs. PRO EA vs. PRO
Independent variable: Total Investment
Bankruptcy Principle Indicator 42.73*** 41.50*** -69.23*** -64.37***
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (7.48) (3.64) (-9.11) (-4.79)
Standardized Success Rate 77.21*** 101.09***
(5.74) (5.40)
Success Rate 26.58 158.92***
(High success rate (p=0.6)=1, Low success rate (p=0.45)=0) (0.90) (3.46)
Sum total of subjects’ switching points from option A to option B in stage 1 -7.13*** -3.57*** -4.98** -5.68**
(from 0 to 10) (-4.88) (-2.16) (-2.20) (-2.07)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 4.13*** 7.09*** 1.53** 2.63***
(7.49) (10.64) (2.09) (2.87)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 15.87 -16.93 -23.89 -58.85
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.59) (-0.61) (-0.64) (-1.31)
Gender - both male 16.50* 34.48*** -27.52** -14.49
(Both Male=1, Other=0) (1.80) (3.25) (-2.47) (-1.01)
Gender - both female 1.91 4.72 0.49 8.30
(Both Female=1, Other=0) (0.24) (0.51) (0.04) (0.53)
Interaction between bankruptcy principle and success rate -12.76 -8.55
(-0.90) (-0.45)
Constant 537.0*** 529.3*** 533.9*** 515.5***
(18.9) (14.99) (13.18) (9.72)
sigma u 96.51*** 76.37*** 106.32*** 107.26***
sigma e 176.17*** 165.66*** 186.28*** 195.74***
Number of Observations 3888 2376 2448 1728
Number of Matching Groups 54 33 34 24
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
z statistics in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Hypothesis 2 states that switching from PRO to EA reduces total investment. We test
this hypothesis with the data we obtained from the second set of experiments in which we
varied the bankruptcy principle between PRO and EA. We employ the same Tobit model
we used to test Hypothesis 1. But this time our bankruptcy principle indicator is a dummy
variable that takes on the value 1 when the principle in place is EA and 0 when it is PRO.
The results, which we present on the third column of Table 3 provide strong support for
the hypothesis. The estimated coefficient for the bankruptcy principle indicator shows that
switching from PRO to EA is on the average associated with a decrease of 69.2 tokens in
total (uncensored) investment.
We then turn to the latter part of Hypothesis 2 which states that the total-investment
difference between PRO and EA is independent of the probability of bankruptcy as long
as both principles induce an interior equilibrium. To test this hypothesis, we rerun our
model with the inclusion of an interaction variable between the bankruptcy principle
and the success probability after limiting our sample to observations we obtained under
pi = 0.45 and pi = 0.6. The results which we report in the right-most column of Table 3
provide empirical support for the hypothesis. We still observe a substantial and significant
drop in (uncensored) investment levels when we move from PRO to EA. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficient for the interaction term between bankruptcy principle and success
probability is statistically insignificant. In other words, the investment difference between
the two bankruptcy principles remains unaffected by the probability of bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 refer to individual investment choices. Accordingly, to test
these hypotheses we adapt the Tobit regression models we constructed to test Hypotheses
1 and 2 to the individual level. In other words, we regress individual level investments on
individual level control variables while still accounting for random effects at the matching
group level.
Hypothesis 3 states that under all three bankruptcy principles, an increase in the prob-
ability of bankruptcy (i.e. a decrease in pi) in turn decreases the creditors’ investment
choices. The results in Table 4 offer strong support for this hypothesized association. The
estimated coefficients for the standardized success probability under different bankruptcy
principles indicate that a higher success probability is associated with a substantial in-
crease in investment levels regardless of the bankruptcy principle in place.24 In fact, a
one standard deviation increase in the success probability is associated with an increase
of about 60 tokens in (uncensored) individual investment under EA; 45 tokens in (uncen-
sored) investment under EL; and more than 50 tokens in (uncensored) investment under
PRO. These numbers correspond to an expected investment jump between 50 to 70 tokens
from low (pi = 0.3) to medium (pi = 0.45) and from medium to high (pi = 0.6) success
probability.25
Hypothesis 4 states that an increase in the creditor’s own risk aversion corresponds to a
decrease in her investment level. The results we present in Table 4 also lend support to
this hypothesis. A subject’s risk-aversion level (as measured by the her switching point
in Holt-Laury) turns out to be negatively associated with her investment levels under all
bankruptcy principles. However, we must also note that we find a much more significant
24We replicated our analyses with a dummy (success rate) variable approach as well. Our results indicate
that individual investment increases significantly as the success rate goes up except for the comparison
between 0.45 and 0.6 under EL and 0.3 and 0.45 under EA. In other words, our regression results match
the nonparametric test results we report above.
25Note that the mean value for pi is 0.45 and its standard deviation is 0.132. The actual increment we
use is 0.15 which corresponds to a 1.14 standard deviation.
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association under EL and PRO. The significance of the estimated coefficient under EA
barely reaches the 10% level.
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Table 4: Results on Hypotheses 3 and 4
Results of Random Effects Tobit Regressions on Individual Investment
Random effects at the matching group level EL vs PRO EA vs PRO
under EL under PRO under EA under PRO
Independent variable: Individual Investment
Standardized Success Rate 46.02*** 53.70*** 63.55*** 66.71***
(4.35) (6.01) (4.38) (4.74)
Stage subject switches from option A to option B in stage 1 -10.89** -9.91** -4.07* -6.52**
(from 0 to 10) (-6.91) (-6.07) (-1.64) (-2.52)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 4.72*** 1.12** -0.26 2.11***
(9.44) (2.13) (-0.39) (2.98)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 2.40 16.4 -33.51 -1.51
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.11) (0.91) (-1.16) (-0.05)
Gender (Male=1, Female=0) 24.46*** -8.88 -5.08 -19.95
(4.10) (-1.41) (-0.58) (-1.20)
Constant 307.31*** 315.09*** 251.28*** 276.04***
(15.70) (17.53) (9.30) (10.23)
sigma u 75.32*** 62.32*** 81.76*** 78.86***
(9.72) (9.31) (7.70) (7.55)
sigma e 152.74*** 164.24*** 168.44*** 173.20***
(64.93) (65.52) (52.30) (50.94)
Number of Observations 3888 3888 2448 2448
Number of matching groups 54 54 34 34
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
z statistics in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
17
Finally, nearly in all these regressions, we find a positive association between experience
with the bankruptcy principle and the level of investment. We interpret this as a learning
effect.
To make sure that our results are not driven by the specific statistical model we use, we
repeated our analyses with random effects GLS regressions as well as linear OLS regres-
sions with clustered errors at the matching group level. We present these analyses in the
Appendix (Subsection 7.6 ). As can be seen in these tables, the GLS and OLS models yield
similar results to the Tobit regressions we presented above and thus offer strong support
for all our hypotheses.
6 Conclusion
We experimentally analyze the implications of switching from proportionality to either
one of two other prominent principles (equal awards and equal losses) when allocating
the value of a bankrupt firm. Our findings can be summarized as follows: Replacing the
proportionality principle with equal losses increases the creditors’ total investment by a
positive amount that is independent of the probability of bankruptcy as long as both
principles induce an interior equilibrium (Hypothesis 1 ). Replacing the proportionality
principle with equal awards decreases the creditors’ total investment by a positive amount
that is independent of the probability of bankruptcy as long as both principles induce an
interior equilibrium (Hypothesis 2 ). An increase in the probability of bankruptcy decreases
a creditor’s investment choice (Hypothesis 3 ). Also, an increase in a creditor’s own risk
aversion decreases her investment choice (Hypothesis 4 ).
In our opinion, the most important findings here are the first two: verification of Hypothe-
sis 1 demonstrates an advantage of equal losses over the universally applied proportionality
principle, which might be relevant for policy-makers. Hypothesis 2, on the other hand,
establishes that replacing the proportionality principle in bankruptcy with equal awards
would come with a cost, that is, it would reduce the creditors’ total investment.
Verification of the independence of these findings from the probability of bankruptcy is
quite surprising since it means that while proportionality, equal losses, and equal awards
principles are quite distinct in terms of how they incentivize creditors, they are simi-
lar in terms of how, under them, the creditors respond to changes in the probability of
bankruptcy.
In our opinion, hypotheses 3 and 4 are less surprising. We expect that, in most real
life investment environments, a firm that is more likely to go bankrupt will attract less
investment and a creditor that is more averse to risk will invest comparatively less.
In line with Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013), our experiments analyze an environment where
the creditors move simultaneously. Their behavior is thus free of any order effects that
might arise in a sequential interaction. An analysis of sequential investment decisions is
interesting in itself, and it is an open question whether our findings extend to it. However,
theoretical and experimental analysis of this case turns out to be quite involved and we
plan to undertake it in a future project. As a first step towards this direction, and to give
the reader an idea about how sequential interaction affects investment behavior, we carried
out numerical analyses under the experimental parameters pi ∈ {0.3, 0.45, 0.6}, r = 1, and
β = 0.4. Our results are presented in Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix (Subsection
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7.3 ). As can be seen there, independent of whether it is creditor 1 or 2 who moves
first, total investment under proportionality (which is independent of order effects, due
to the dominant strategy equilibrium under this principle) still remains lower than total
investment under equal losses and higher than total investment under equal awards. That
is, hypotheses 1 and 2 extend to sequential-moves for these parameter combinations. This,
however, should only be taken as an encouragement for further analysis in this direction;
without a formal and experimental analysis, there is no way of making a general statement.
The tables, on the other hand, establish that, in terms of total investment levels, there
is no fixed ordering among the three versions of the game (that is, simultaneous-moves,
creditor 1 moving first, and creditor 2 moving first). This is true even when the comparison
is restricted to cases where creditors 1 and 2 have identical risk parameters. Then, the
two versions of the sequential game naturally produce identical total investment levels, but
their ordering with respect to the simultaneous-move version of the game is not fixed.
As discussed in Section 4 (see Footnote 14 and the related paragraph), in the main body
of the experiment we do not provide subjects with information about the other’s risk
parameter. However, in the Appendix (Subsection 7.4 ), we present results on sessions
where, under PRO and EL principles, we provide information about others’ risk group
(i.e. a set of risk parameters). There we show this information to have no significant
effect on a subject’s investment behavior.
In the Appendix (Subsection 7.5 ), we also provide an analysis of the correlates of extreme
investment behavior (i.e. zero or full investment) in our experiment. To summarize,
we find that (i) replacing the proportionality principle with equal losses increases (re-
spectively, decreases) the likelihood that the creditor will choose full (respectively, zero)
investment; (ii) replacing the proportionality principle with equal awards decreases (re-
spectively, increases) the likelihood that the creditor will choose full (respectively, zero)
investment; (iii) experienced subjects are more likely to make extreme investment choices;
and (iv) male subjects are more likely to make extreme investment choices.
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) also compares the three principles in terms of the creditors’ equi-
librium social welfare, and finds that proportionality always induces a higher egalitarian
social welfare than equal awards and equal losses.26 A somewhat weaker conclusion also
holds for utilitarian social welfare comparisons. Since an experimental test of these pre-
dictions requires the strong assumption that the subjects have CARA utilities, we refrain
from presenting results on this front. However, a more detailed discussion of the issue, as
well as a regression analysis, is available upon request.
As noted in the introduction, the axiomatic literature is abundant with bankruptcy rules
that differ from each other in terms of which principle they apply to what type of prob-
lems; see Thomson (2003, 2008) for a comprehensive list. Rather than focusing on any
one these specific suggestions, we follow Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) and focus on the three
general principles that underly them. We hope our findings will provide basis for further
research that looks into more specific policy recommendations. However, it is useful to
mention that, along with the Proportional rule (PRO), the axiomatic literature contains
two bankruptcy rules that are very closely related to EA and EL: the Constrained Equal
Awards rule (CEA) (respectively, the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL)) equates gains
(losses) subject to the constraint that no agent gains (loses) more than her investment.27
26Egalitarian and utilitarian measures of social welfare are respectively calculated as the minimum and
sum of the creditors’ equilibrium welfare levels.
27For experimental purposes, the (unconstrained) principles are much simpler than these bankruptcy
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It turns out that the theoretical implications of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) also apply to
CEA (whenever CEA admits an equilibrium) and CEL (whenever CEL admits an equilib-
rium in which all agents choose positive investment levels). Furthermore, the constraints
imposed by CEA and CEL are binding only in “more extreme” cases where the creditors
significantly differ in their investment decisions.28 Therefore, we expect that a study which
specifically compares CEA, CEL, and PRO would obtain results similar to ours.
Another interesting research direction is regarding the success probability. While it is
taken to be independent of the level of total investments both in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013)
and in this study, one can imagine interesting real life examples where the probability of
success increases in total investments in the project. A study of such cases is left for future
research.
Finally, our experimental data does not support the theoretical prediction of Kıbrıs and
Kıbrıs (2013) that total investment will be zero under pi = 0.3. We believe there might
be two sources of this tendency to invest non-zero amounts. First, the expected loss in
case of bankruptcy is not too large.29 Second, when endowed with a non-monetary utility
of winning, experimental subjects might have preferred non-zero investments, similar to
over-dissipation in contests (Sheremeta, 2010). This behavior persists even when subjects
are explicitly instructed to invest zero in the contests (Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014). We
think these two effects might be jointly contributing towards subject’s tendency to invest
non-zero amounts when pi = 0.3. Further analysis of these predictions is left for future
research.
References
[1] Aumann, R. J. and Maschler, M. (1985), “Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy
Problem from the Talmud”, Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 195-213.
[2] Azrieli, Y., Chambers, C. P., and Healy, P., “Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical
Analysis”, Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
[3] Bajtelsmit, V. L., Bernasek, A. (1996), “Why do women invest differently than men?”,
Financial Counseling and Planning, 7, 1-10.
[4] Bajtelsmit, V.L. and VanDerhei, J.A. (1997), “Risk aversion and retirement income
adequacy. Positioning pensions for the twenty-first century.”, Michael S. Gordon,
Olivia S. Mitchell, Marc M. Twinney, Eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
[5] Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth edition (2004), West Publishing Co.
[6] Bris, A., Welch, I. and Zhu, N. (2006), “The costs of bankruptcy: Chapter 7 liquida-
tion versus Chapter 11 reorganization”, Journal of Finance, LXI (3), 1253-1303.
rules (which incorporate additional clauses on what to do in case of such constraints), and thus, they are
easier to explain to the subjects.
28For example, such cases correspond to only 13.6% of our data that exhibits bankruptcy under EL and
to only 17.6% of our data that exhibits bankruptcy under EA.
29In particular the expected loss is slightly above 10% of the invested amount when the success rate is
0.3. In addition, typical investment levels of 150− 200 observed for pi = 0.3 corresponds to less than 50%
of the pie, bringing the expected loss to around 5% of the endowment.
20
[7] Brookins, P. and Ryvkin, D. (2014), “An experimental study of bidding in contests
of incomplete information”, Experimental Economics, 17 (2), 245-261.
[8] Bu¨yu¨kboyacı, M. (2014), “The Risk Attitudes and The Stag-Hunt Games”, Eco-
nomics Letters, 124 (3), 323-325.
[9] Cappelen, A. W., Luttens, R. I., Sorensen, E., and Tungodden, B. (2015), “Fairness
in bankruptcy situations: an experimental study”, Norwegian School of Economics
Discussion Paper.
[10] Chang, C., Hu, C-C. (2008), “A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of
bankruptcy problems”, Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 133-144.
[11] Chun, Y. (1989), “A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing”,
Mathematical Social Sciences, 17, 245–261.
[12] Costa-Gomes, M. and Weizsa¨cker, G. (2008), “Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal
Form Games ”, Review of Economic Studies, 75 (3), 729-762.
[13] Curiel, I., Maschler, M. and Tijs, S. H. (1987), “Bankruptcy Games”, Zeitschrift fu¨r
Operations Research, 31, A143-A159.
[14] Dagan, N. and Volij, O. (1993), “ The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargain-
ing Approach”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 26, 287-297.
[15] Dagan, N., Serrano, R., and Volij, O. (1997), “A Non-cooperative View of Consistent
Bankruptcy Rules”, Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 55-72.
[16] Dutta, B. and Ray, D. (1989), “A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation
Constraints”, Econometrica, 57, 615-635.
[17] Eraslan, H. K. and Yılmaz, B. (2007), “Deliberation and Security Design in
Bankruptcy”, mimeo.
[18] Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experi-
ments”, Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178.
[19] Ga¨chter, S., and Riedl, A. (2005), “Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible
claims ”, Management Science, 51 (2), 249-263.
[20] Ga¨chter, S., and Riedl, A. (2006), “Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims:
Normative judgments and actual negotiations ”, Social Choice and Welfare, 27 (3),
571-594.
[21] Garcia-Jurado, I., Gonzalez-Diaz, J. & Villar, A. (2006), “A noncooperative approach
to bankruptcy problems”, Spanish Economic Review, 8:3, 189-197.
[22] Heller-Wiensky, S. (1971), “Abraham Ibn Ezra”, Encyclopedia Judaica, 8, 1163-1170.
[23] Herrero, C. (2003), “Equal Awards vs Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy”, in M.R.
Sertel and S. Koray (eds), Advances in Economic Design, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
413-426.
[24] Herrero, C., Moreno-Ternero, J. D., and Ponti, G. (2010), “On the adjudication of
conflicting claims: an experimental study ”, Social Choice and Welfare, 34(1), 145-
179.
21
[25] Herrero, C., Villar, A. (2002), “Sustainability in bankruptcy problems”, TOP, 10:2,
261-273.
[26] Hinz, R.P., McCarthy, D.D. and Turner, J.A. (1997), “Are women more conservative
investors?: gender differences in participant-directed pension investments. Positioning
pensions for the twenty-first century. ”, Michael S. Gordon, Olivia S. Mitchell, Marc
M. Twinney, Eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
[27] Karago¨zog˘lu, E. (2014), “A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with
an Endogenous Estate”, Annals of Operations Research, 217(1), 299-318.
[28] Kıbrıs, O¨., and Kıbrıs, A. (2013), “On the investment implications of bankruptcy
laws”, Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 85-99.
[29] Moreno-Ternero, J.D. and Villar A. (2006), “The TAL Family of Rules for Bankruptcy
Problems”, Social Choice and Welfare, 27(2), 231-249.
[30] O’Neill, B. (1982), “A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud”, Mathematical
Social Sciences, 2, 345-371.
[31] Sheremeta, R. M. (2010), “Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage
contests”, Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (2), 731-747.
[32] Stromberg, P. (2000), “Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy
Auctions: Theory and Tests”, Journal of Finance, LV, 6, 2641-2692.
[33] Thomson, W. (2003), “Axiomatic and Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bankruptcy and
Taxation Problems: a Survey”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 45, 249-297.
[34] Thomson, W. (2008), How to Divide When There Isn’t Enough: From Talmud to
Game Theory, unpublished manuscript.
[35] Yuh, Y. and Hanna, S. (1997), “The Demand for Risky Assets in Retirement Portfo-
lios”, Proceedings of the Academy of Financial Services.
22
7 Appendix
7.1 Instructions Used in the Experiment
[Participants of a session saw Part 1 and Part 2 sequentially. Part 1 of the experiment
differed between treatment with and without risk information: In the treatments with risk
information, in addition to the regular-font text, subjects also saw the italic text. In Part
2, as explained in Section 4, we used a within-subject design for bankruptcy principles.
Before explaining the game in Part 2, subjects were informed that this part consisted of
36 periods, with 4 blocks of 9 identical decision periods in each block; and before the
start of each block they would be given information that was relevant for the following
9 periods. (Once the block was over, they would receive information that would be rele-
vant for the next 9 periods and so on.) In the same session, subjects either went through
EL-PRO-EL-PRO or EA-PRO-EA-PRO (or with the reverse order). For instance, in EL-
PRO-EL-PRO (EA-PRO-EA-PRO) sessions, subjects played the game according to EL
(EA) in the first block, according to PRO in the second block, according to EL (EA) in
the third block, and according to PRO in the last block. To avoid repetition, below we
only present the instructions for EL, PRO, and EA once. The following instructions are
for pi = 0.6. Instructions used in treatments with different success-rates were similar.]
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment!
We will read the instructions together. Please do not touch the keyboard for now and
listen to the instructions carefully.
This is an experiment about economic decision making. All participants will earn some
money during the experiment. The money you earn might be different from the other
participants earnings. This amount is dependent on your decisions as well as the decisions
of other participants. Please do not talk to each other during the experiment. We will have
to terminate the experiment if you violate this rule. We will now describe the experimental
procedures. It is very important that you understand all the parts. Please raise your hand
if you have a question.
There will be two parts in our experiment. You will be instructed about each part before
it starts. At the end of the experiment, you will learn about your total earnings from
each part. Your earnings will be in tokens. 100 tokens corresponds to 1 TL. Your total
earnings will be rounded to the nearest 25 kurus.30 In addition to your earnings in the
experiment, you will be paid a 5 TL participation fee.
PART 1
You will see a table like this in stage 1. In this part, you will face 10 different rows.
Each row provides two options, Option A and Option B. You will slide the bar in the
middle to show which option you chose for that row. These options are basically lotteries
that indicate your chances of winning a certain payoff. For each row, you will be asked to
301 TL is 100 kurus.
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Figure 1: Holt-Laury method in Part 1
choose one among Option A and Option B. Choosing Option B at some row automatically
means that you choose Option B in all the rows below it.
For instance, consider Row 1. In Row 1 Option A offers 400 tokens with probability
1/10 and 320 tokens with probability 9/10. In Row 1 Option B offers 770 tokens with
probability 1/10 and 20 tokens with probability 9/10.
Your earnings from this part will be determined as follows: First the system will pick a
number between 1 and 10. This number will tell us the row that will be used in determining
your earnings from this part.
Suppose that this number turns out to be 7 and that you have chosen Option A for row 7.
The system will choose another number between 1 and 10. If this number is 7 or smaller
(with probability 7/10 ), you will earn 400 tokens. If this number is 8 or larger (with
probability 3/10 ), you will earn 320 tokens.
Before passing to Part 2, we will ask you to answer the following question: Which color
do you like more? Blue or Green.
PART 2-[EL]
Block 1: (please see Figure 2)
At the beginning of each period, you will be matched with another subject randomly and
you will form a team together. In each period, you can be matched with a person you are
matched earlier or not. The identity of other team member will not be revealed to you at
any time.
You will be given the following information about your teammate. Which color she likes
more, blue or green, and whether she switched from Option A to Option B in the first
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stage before or after Row 5. Similar information will be given to your teammate as well.
At the beginning of each period, you will be given 400 tokens as your endowment. Then,
you will decide how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project (between 0
and 400) and how many of them to keep in your private account. You will enter your
contribution to the team project into the box on the screen.
Similarly, other person in your team will be given 400 tokens as her endowment. Then,
she will be asked to choose how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project
and how many of them to keep in her private account. Both your contribution and other
team member’s contribution can be any number between 0 and 400.
The value of the project will be determined as the sum of your and other team member’s
contributions. Once the value of the project is determined this way, we will randomly
choose a number between 1 and 100. If it is 60 or lower (occurring with probability
60/100): The value of the project doubles. If it is higher than 60, the value of the project
shrinks to 40% of its original value. If the value of the project doubles, period earnings
for each team member will be 2 times her contribution to the project plus the tokens she
keeps in her private account. If the value of the project shrinks to 40% of its original
value, period earnings for each team member will be the tokens she keeps in her private
account plus her contribution to the project minus half of the total loss (0.3 times total
contributions)
After you and other team member state your contribution levels, you will observe the
following on the screen: (i) Both your and other team member’s contribution levels, (ii)
Whether the value of team project increased or decreased, and (iii) Your earnings for that
period.
This will be the end of the current period. You will then move on to the next period where
you will be matched with someone to play the game again as we described earlier.
Example 1:
• Suppose you contribute 220 of your 400 tokens and you keep 180 tokens in your
private account.
• Other team member contributes 280 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
120 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 220 + 280 = 500.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 80 (higher than
60).
• The value of project becomes 500 × 0.4 = 200. The loss in the value of the project
is 500 - 200 = 300
• Your period payoff is: 180 + 220 - 300/2 = 250.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 120 + 280 - 300/2 = 250.
Example 2:
• Suppose you contributed 200 of your 400 tokens and you keep 200 tokens in your
private account.
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Figure 2: Overview of Part 2-EL
• Other team member contributed 240 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
160 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 200 + 240 = 440.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 30 (lower than
60).
• The value of project becomes 440 × 2 =880.
• Your period payoff is: 200 + 200 × 2 = 600.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 160 + 240 × 2 = 640.
PART 2-[PRO]
Block 1: (please see Figure 3)
At the beginning of each period, you will be matched with another subject randomly and
you will form a team together. In each period, you can be matched with a person you
were matched earlier or not. The identity of other team member will not be revealed to
you at any time.
At the beginning of each period, you will be given 400 tokens as your endowment. Then,
you will decide how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project (between 0
and 400) and how many of them to keep in your private account. You will enter your
contribution to the team project into the box on the screen.
Similarly, other person in your team will be given 400 tokens as her endowment. Then,
she will be asked to choose how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project
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and how many of them to keep in her private account. Both your contribution and other
team member’s contribution can be any number between 0 and 400.
The value of the project will be determined as the sum of your and other team member’s
contributions. Once the value of the project is determined this way, we will randomly
choose a number between 1 and 100. If it is 60 or lower (occurring with probability
60/100): The value of the project doubles. If it is higher than 60, the value of the project
shrinks to 40% of its original value. If the value of the project doubles, period earnings
for each team member will be 2 times her contribution to the project plus the tokens she
keeps in her private account. If the value of the project shrinks to 40% of its original
value, period earnings for each team member will be the tokens she keeps in her private
account plus 40% of her contribution to the project.
After you and other team member state your contribution levels, you will observe the
following on the screen: (i) Both your and other team member’s contribution levels, (ii)
Whether the value of team project increased or decreased, and (iii) Your earnings for that
period.
This will be the end of the current period. You will then move on to the next period where
you will be matched with someone to play the game again as we described earlier.
Example 1:
• Suppose you contribute 220 of your 400 tokens and you keep 180 tokens in your
private account.
• Other team member contributes 280 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
120 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 220 + 280 = 500.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 80 (higher than
60).
• The value of project becomes 500 × 0.4 = 200.
• Your period payoff is: 180 + 220*0.4 = 266.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 120 + 280*0.4 = 232.
Example 2:
• Suppose you contributed 200 of your 400 tokens and you keep 200 tokens in your
private account.
• Other team member contributed 240 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
160 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 200 + 240 = 440.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 30 (lower than
60).
• The value of project becomes 440 × 2 =880.
• Your period payoff is: 200 + 200 × 2 = 600.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 160 + 240 × 2 = 640.
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Figure 3: Overview of Part 2-PRO
PART 2-[EA]
Block 1: (please see Figure 4)
At the beginning of each period, you will be matched with another subject randomly and
you will form a team together. In each period, you can be matched with a person you are
matched earlier or not. The identity of other team member will not be revealed to you at
any time.
At the beginning of each period, you will be given 400 tokens as your endowment. Then,
you will decide how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project (between 0
and 400) and how many of them to keep in your private account. You will enter your
contribution to the team project into the box on the screen.
Similarly, other person in your team will be given 400 tokens as her endowment. Then,
she will be asked to choose how many of these tokens to contribute to the team project
and how many of them to keep in her private account. Both your contribution and other
team member’s contribution can be any number between 0 and 400.
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The value of the project will be determined as the sum of your and other team member’s
contributions. Once the value of the project is determined this way, we will randomly
choose a number between 1 and 100. If it is 60 or lower (occurring with probability
60/100): The value of the project doubles. If it is higher than 60, the value of the project
shrinks to 40% of its original value. If the value of the project doubles, period earnings
for each team member will be 2 times her contribution to the project plus the tokens she
keeps in her private account. If the value of the project shrinks to 40% of its original
value, period earnings for each team member will be the tokens she keeps in her private
account plus half of the current value of the project (0.2(C1+C2)).
After you and other team member state your contribution levels, you will observe the
following on the screen: (i) Both your and other team member’s contribution levels, (ii)
Whether the value of team project increased or decreased, and (iii) Your earnings for that
period.
This will be the end of the current period. You will then move on to the next period where
you will be matched with someone to play the game again as we described earlier.
Figure 4: Overview of Part 2-EA
Example 1:
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• Suppose you contribute 220 of your 400 tokens and you keep 180 tokens in your
private account.
• Other team member contributes 280 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
120 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 220 + 280 = 500.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 80 (higher than
60).
• The value of project becomes 500 × 0.4 = 200.
• Your period payoff is: 180 + 200/2 = 280.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 120 + 200/2 = 220.
Example 2:
• Suppose you contributed 200 of your 400 tokens and you keep 200 tokens in your
private account.
• Other team member contributed 240 of her 400 tokens to the team project and keeps
160 tokens in her private account.
• The value of the project is 200 + 240 = 440.
• Then a random number from 1 to 100 is selected and it comes out as 30 (lower than
60).
• The value of project becomes 440 × 2 =880.
• Your period payoff is: 200 + 200 × 2 = 600.
• Other team member’s period payoff is: 160 + 240 × 2 = 640.
7.2 Timetrend and distribution of individual investments
In Figure 5, we present the time trend for the average individual investments to the group
project under each bankruptcy principle and success probability. Note that, in a given
session subjects play under a fixed success probability and go through 4 blocks of 9 rounds,
with the bankruptcy principle changing from one block to the next. The figure displays
the first time EL and PRO is played (in blocks 1 and 2) on the left and the second time
EL and PRO is played (in blocks 3 and 4) on the right. It shows that investment under
EL rarely falls below that of PRO and this difference is especially prominent when the
success probability takes its lowest value of pi = 0.3. We also see that, in all cases but
one (namely, PRO with pi = 0.3), investment during final periods are higher than initial
periods of the experiment.
The prevalence of higher investment under PRO compared to EA is documented for all
success rates, with no specific time trend being observable in this figure .
Figure 6 presents histograms showing how the subjects are distributed to different invest-
ment levels (the horizontal axis). The top charts visualize the distribution in the EL-PRO
sessions. Observe that a move from PRO to EL slightly increases the fraction of subjects
who invest all their endowment. Additionally, a move from PRO to EL slightly decreases
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Figure 5: Time Trend of Investment
the fraction of subjects who choose zero investment. The bottom charts visualize the dis-
tribution in the EA-PRO sessions. Here, we observe that for the low success rate pi = 0.3,
a higher frequency of investments are clustered below 200 (half of endowment) for EA
compared to PRO. On the other hand, for high success rates (pi = 0.45, pi = 0.6}), the
frequency of subjects investing all of their endowment is slightly higher under PRO com-
pared to EA. A detailed analysis of extreme investment behavior in EA-PRO treatments
is available in Subsection 7.5.
7.3 A Numerical Analysis of Sequential Investment Decisions
Tables A1, A2, and A3 present results of a numerical analysis where, for the case of two
agents, we calculated the total investment levels under seven different versions of the in-
vestment game: PRO represents the dominant strategy equilibrium under simultaneous
moves as well as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under sequential interactions; EA-
SIM and EL-SIM represent the Nash equilibrium under simultaneous moves for principles
EA and EL respectively; EA-SEQ-1FIRST and EL-SEQ-1FIRST represent (respectively
for EA and EL) the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential interaction when
Creditor 1 moves first; finally EA-SEQ-2FIRST and EL-SEQ-2FIRST represent (respec-
tively for EA and EL) the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential interaction
when Creditor 2 moves first. The first two columns of the tables, a1 and a2, show the risk
aversion parameters used for creditors 1 and 2 respectively. All numerical calculations are
made for the experimental parameters r = 1 and β = 0.4. Table A1 assumes pi = 0.3.
Table A2 assumes pi = 0.45. And Table A3 assumes pi = 0.6. The results are discussed in
the Conclusion section.
7.4 Implications of Information of the Partner’s Risk Group
In Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013), the partner’s risk aversion has an effect on a player’s equilib-
rium investment for the principles EL and EA, but not for PRO. In the current experiment,
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests fail to find a difference between the sessions where information
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Figure 6: Histograms of Investment in EL-PRO Sessions (top) and EA-PRO Sessions
(bottom)
on partner’s risk was available versus when it wasn’t. In particular for EL, the test re-
sults in a p-value = 0.943 when the success rate is 0.6 and in a p-value = 0.394 when
the success rate is 0.3. Similar results are obtained for PRO, where we obtain a p-value
= 0.722 when the success rate is 0.6 and a p-value = 0.477 when the success rate is 0.3.
Further evidence comes from our regression analyses. When included in the regressions
presented in Tables 3 and 4, the dummy variable “Availability of information on partner’s
risk attitude” (which takes on the value 1 if information was available and 0 if not) yields
insignificant coefficients.31
Regarding this finding, two important points are worth mentioning. First, in the experi-
ment the subjects received very coarse information about their partner’s risk attitude.32.
This significantly decreased the degree of variance in the information regarding the part-
ner’s risk attitudes, and consequently subjects were not able to differentiate the behavior
of risk averse partners from the behavior of risk loving ones. The second point is related to
the findings presented in Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008), pointing out that a subject
pays more attention to the opponents’ incentives when she is asked to state her beliefs
about it. Since subjects were not asked to state their beliefs in the experiment, it might
have been that they were not very sensitive to this information.33
31Results available upon request.
32An explanation for this specification in design is provided in Footnote 14.
33Bu¨yu¨kboyacı (2014) showed that even though subjects responded to their opponents’ risk-aversion
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7.5 Correlates of Extreme Investment Behavior
The results on the likelihood of extreme investment choices are presented in Table A4.
The first column reveals that the likelihood of a subject investing all of her endowment
(i.e. choosing full investment) is significantly higher (lower) under EL (EA) compared to
the same likelihood under PRO, a finding consistent with Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2).
A higher success rate and a lower risk aversion level also increases the likelihood of full
investment,
Additionally, the second column of Table A4 reveals that the likelihood of a subject in-
vesting nothing is significantly lower (higher) under EL (EA) compared to under PRO.
Similarly, subjects are significantly less likely to choose zero investment under higher suc-
cess rates. Compared to the case of full investment (column 1), risk aversion has a less
significant effect on the likelihood of making zero investment, which seems to be deter-
mined mainly by the bankruptcy principle and the success rate.
Interestingly, “number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle” is observed
to have a significant positive effect. That is, subjects become more likely to make these
extreme choices (full or zero investment) as they gain more experience with a given prin-
ciple. We also find a significant gender effect, suggesting that male subjects have a higher
likelihood of making extreme investment choices compared to female subjects. This result
is consistent with other findings in the literature (e.g. see Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei, 1997;
Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, and Jianakoplos, 1996; Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner, 1997; Yuh and
Hanna, 1997) which establish that women make more conservative retirement investments
compared to men.
7.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present the regression results we obtain when we repeat our analyses
with random effects GLS regressions as well as linear OLS regressions with clustered
errors at the matching group level. As can be seen in tables A5, A6, A7, A8, the results
remain very similar. Hence, our conclusions remain valid under these alternative model
specifications as well.
information while choosing their actions, they did show no strategic sophistication on guessing how others
may have chosen their actions with the same information.
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Table A1: Total Investment Under Simultaneous and Sequential Interaction (pi = 0.3, r =
1, β = 0.4)
a1 a2 PRO EA-SIM EA-SEQ- EA-SEQ- EL-SIM EL-SEQ- EL-SEQ-
1FIRST 2FIRST 1FIRST 2FIRST
0.005 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.17 124.10 124.10
0.005 0.0125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.42 50.00 77.95
0.005 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.73 60.00 62.57
0.005 0.0325 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.90 50.00 54.87
0.005 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.62 50.00 54.87
0.005 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 57.00 50.00 54.87
0.0125 0.0125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.67 45.03 45.03
0.0125 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.98 44.49 37.33
0.0125 0.0325 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.69 31.52 29.64
0.0125 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.29 30.00 21.95
0.0125 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.23 20.00 21.95
0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.29 29.10 29.10
0.02 0.0325 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.01 23.83 21.41
0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.60 20.87 21.41
0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.33 20.00 13.72
0.0325 0.0325 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.72 16.13 16.13
0.0325 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.32 13.18 16.13
0.0325 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 11.61 16.13
0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.92 13.18 13.18
0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.64 11.61 13.18
0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.37 11.61 11.61
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Table A2: Total Investment Under Simultaneous and Sequential Interaction (pi = 0.45, r =
1, β = 0.4)
a1 a2 PRO EA-SIM EA-SEQ- EA-SEQ- EL-SIM EL-SEQ- EL-SEQ-
1FIRST 2FIRST 1FIRST 2FIRST
0.005 0.005 77.54 5.62 13.61 13.61 250.83 285.12 285.12
0.005 0.0125 54.28 3.93 12.11 2.50 175.58 150.00 185.12
0.005 0.02 48.46 3.51 11.74 2.50 156.77 170.00 162.05
0.005 0.0325 44.73 3.24 11.50 2.50 157.25 150.00 154.35
0.005 0.05 42.65 3.09 11.36 2.50 159.27 150.00 154.35
0.005 0.07 41.54 3.01 11.29 2.50 160.35 150.00 154.35
0.0125 0.0125 31.02 2.25 1.00 1.00 100.33 115.59 115.59
0.0125 0.02 25.20 1.83 0.62 1.00 81.52 92.43 92.51
0.0125 0.0325 21.47 1.56 0.38 1.00 69.46 85.29 77.13
0.0125 0.05 19.38 1.40 0.25 1.00 62.71 70.00 69.43
0.0125 0.07 18.28 1.32 0.18 1.00 62.53 60.00 61.74
0.02 0.02 19.38 1.40 0.62 0.62 62.71 69.36 69.36
0.02 0.0325 15.66 1.13 0.38 0.62 50.65 62.21 53.97
0.02 0.05 13.57 0.98 0.25 0.62 43.89 53.90 46.28
0.02 0.07 12.46 0.90 0.18 0.62 40.31 50.00 46.28
0.0325 0.0325 11.93 0.86 0.38 0.38 38.59 46.82 46.82
0.0325 0.05 9.84 0.71 0.25 0.38 31.84 38.51 31.44
0.0325 0.07 8.73 0.63 0.18 0.38 28.25 34.10 31.44
0.05 0.05 7.75 0.56 0.25 0.25 25.08 30.82 30.82
0.05 0.07 6.65 0.48 0.18 0.25 21.50 26.41 23.13
0.07 0.07 5.54 0.40 0.18 0.18 17.92 18.72 18.72
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Table A3: Total Investment Under Simultaneous and Sequential Interaction (pi = 0.6, r =
1, β = 0.4)
a1 a2 PRO EA-SIM EA-SEQ- EA-SEQ- EL-SIM EL-SEQ- EL-SEQ-
1FIRST 2FIRST 1FIRST 2FIRST
0.005 0.005 229.07 157.15 158.73 158.73 402.36 432.22 432.22
0.005 0.0125 160.35 110.01 116.83 114.29 281.65 250.00 293.76
0.005 0.02 143.17 98.22 106.35 103.18 251.47 270.00 262.99
0.005 0.0325 132.16 90.66 99.63 92.07 252.25 250.00 247.61
0.005 0.05 125.99 86.43 84.76 92.07 255.50 250.00 247.61
0.005 0.07 122.72 84.19 82.77 80.96 257.22 250.00 247.61
0.0125 0.0125 91.63 62.86 61.27 61.27 160.94 175.97 175.97
0.0125 0.02 74.45 51.07 50.79 50.16 130.77 146.52 137.50
0.0125 0.0325 63.44 43.52 44.08 39.05 111.42 122.71 114.43
0.0125 0.05 57.27 39.29 40.32 39.05 100.59 110.00 106.73
0.0125 0.07 54.00 37.04 38.32 39.05 100.30 100.00 99.04
0.02 0.02 57.27 39.29 39.68 39.68 100.59 108.06 108.06
0.02 0.0325 46.26 31.73 32.97 28.57 81.25 91.94 69.59
0.02 0.05 40.09 27.50 29.21 28.57 70.41 78.61 77.29
0.02 0.07 36.82 25.26 27.21 28.57 64.66 71.53 69.59
0.0325 0.0325 35.24 24.18 21.86 21.86 61.90 68.86 68.86
0.0325 0.05 29.07 19.95 18.10 21.86 51.07 55.53 53.48
0.0325 0.07 25.80 17.70 16.10 21.86 45.32 48.46 45.79
0.05 0.05 22.91 15.72 18.10 18.10 40.24 40.15 40.15
0.05 0.07 19.63 13.47 16.10 18.10 34.49 40.76 40.15
0.07 0.07 16.36 11.23 16.10 16.10 28.74 33.07 33.07
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Table A4: Results on Extreme Investment Choices
Results of Random Effects Probit Regressions
on Binary Indicators of Extreme Investment
Random effects at the matching group level
Independent variable:
Full Investment Zero Investment
Bankruptcy Principle Indicator 0.137*** -0.275***
(EL=1, PRO=0) (4.25) (-4.97)
Bankruptcy Principle Indicator -0.221*** 0.164***
(EA=1, PRO=0) (-5.12) (3.10)
Standardized Success Rate 0.315*** -0.324***
(5.45) (-3.67)
Subject’s switching point in Stage 1 -0.083*** -0.022*
(from 0 to 10) (-10.18) (-1.74)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 0.035*** 0.037***
(13.72) (9.71)
Gender 0.312*** 0.608***
(Male=1, Female=0) (10.09) (12.42)
Constant -0.731*** -2.40***
(-8.67) (-17.94)
sigma u 0.524*** 0.770***
Number of Observations 12672 12672
Number of Matching Groups 88 88
Observations per matching group 144 144
z statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A5: Results on Hypotheses 1 and 2
Results of Random Effects GLS Regressions on Total Investment
Random effects at the matching group level EL vs. PRO EA vs. PRO
Independent variable: Total Investment
Bankruptcy Principle Indicator 39.43*** 37.90*** -65.07*** -61.03***
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (7.66) (3.75) (-9.36) (-5.07)
Standardized Success Rate 71.92*** 95.08***
(5.50) (5.10)
Success Rate 22.49 145.33***
(High success rate (p=0.6)=1, Low success rate (p=0.45)=0) (0.81) (3.17)
Sum total of subjects’ switching points from option A to option B in stage 1 -6.22*** -3.14*** -5.09** -5.75**
(from 0 to 10) (-4.71) (-2.14) (-2.44) (-2.32)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 3.47*** 5.99*** 1.43** 2.39***
(7.01) (10.22) (2.14) (2.92)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 14.02 -16.90 -19.61 -51.01
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.53) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-1.13)
Gender - both male 16.66** 32.90*** -30.13*** -21.03*
(Both Male=1, Other=0) (2.01) (3.50) (-2.97) (-1.65)
Gender - both female 1.73 3.98 2.39 10.20
(Both Female=1, Other=0) (0.24) (0.49) (0.19) (0.72)
Interaction between bankruptcy principle and success rate -12.21 -4.28
(-0.96) (-0.25)
Constant 525.3*** 526.7*** 527.1*** 511.5***
(19.69) (16.19) (13.65) (10.07)
sigma u 94.21 72.63 106.26 108.28
sigma e 160.47 148.46 172.16 176.94
Number of Observations 3888 2376 2448 1728
Number of Matching Groups 54 33 34 24
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
z statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A6: Results on Hypotheses 1 and 2
Results of OLS Regressions on Total Investment
Clustered errors at the matching group level EL vs. PRO EA vs. PRO
Independent variable: Total Investment
Bankruptcy Principle Indicator 39.43*** 37.90*** -65.07*** -61.03**
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (3.35) (3.54) (-3.61) (-2.09)
Standardized Success Rate 72.62*** 97.76***
(5.63) (6.29)
Success Rate 19.46 147.18***
(High success rate (p=0.6)=1, Low success rate (p=0.45)=0) (0.68) (3.23)
Sum total of subjects’ switching points from option A to option B in stage 1 -6.77** -3.26 -2.59 -3.81
(from 0 to 10) (-2.02) (-1.01) (-0.87) (-1.14)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 3.47*** 5.99*** 1.43 2.39*
(3.52) (6.52) (1.31) (1.98)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 16.75 -15.87 -22.08 -57.90
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.56) (-0.67) (-0.61) (-1.29)
Gender - both male 26.42 27.85 -27.21 -10.09
(Both Male=1, Other=0) (1.40) (1.88) (-1.15) (-0.41)
Gender - both female 2.54 15.54 -8.36 -5.81
(Both Female=1, Other=0) (0.15) (0.89) (-0.33) (-0.18)
Interaction between bankruptcy principle and success rate -12.21 -4.28
(-0.59) (-0.11)
Constant 530.4*** 527.2*** 497.1*** 490.8***
(11.21) (9.61) (12.14) (10.62)
Number of Observations 3888 2376 2448 1728
Number of Matching Groups 54 33 34 24
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A7: Results on Hypotheses 3 and 4
Results of Random Effects GLS Regressions on Individual Investment
Random effects at the matching group level EL vs PRO EA vs PRO
under EL under PRO under EA under PRO
Independent variable: Individual Investment
Standardized Success Rate 33.00*** 38.25*** 49.35*** 47.21***
(4.44) (5.78) (4.59) (4.82)
Stage subject switches from option A to option B in stage 1 -6.93*** -6.47*** -3.14** -4.17**
(from 0 to 10) (-6.75) (-5.84) (-1.83) (-2.44)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 2.91*** 0.58 0.04 1.40***
(8.72) (1.59) (0.09) (2.99)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 5.37 9.20 -19.07 -2.52
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.36) (0.69) (-0.89) (-0.13)
Gender (Male=1, Female=0) 13.84** -6.82 -5.48 -16.71***
(3.47) (-1.58 (-0.91) (-2.78)
Constant 272.38*** 279.20*** 227.32*** 251.84***
(20.22) (21.71) (11.66) (13.69)
sigma u 53.14 46.63 60.96 55.18
sigma e 107.82 117.03 120.97 120.41
Number of Observations 3888 3888 2448 2448
Number of matching groups 54 54 34 34
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
z statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A8: Results on Hypotheses 3 and 4
Results of OLS Regressions on Individual Investment
Clustered errors at the matching group level EL vs PRO EA vs PRO
under EL under PRO under EA under PRO
Independent variable: Individual Investment
Standardized Success Rate 33.31*** 38.24*** 49.44*** 47.76***
-4.33 (5.92) (5.19) (5.29)
Stage subject switches from option A to option B in stage 1 -5.97** -8.04*** -1.32 -4.48
(from 0 to 10) (-2.29) (-2.79) (-0.46) (-1.45)
Number of rounds played under the same bankruptcy principle 2.91*** 0.58 0.04 1.40**
(5.55) (0.80) (0.06) (2.14)
Bankruptcy principle in the first round 4.76 9.63 -18.55 -3.55
(EL=1, PRO=0 for EL vs PRO and EA=1, PRO=0 for EA vs PRO) (0.32) (0.78) (-0.89) (-0.18)
Gender (Male=1, Female=0) 21.61** -9.29 -9.34 -10.25
(2.34) (-1.12) (-0.73) (-0.68)
Constant 263.02*** 290.22*** 217.52*** 250.63***
(13.05) (12.83) (9.30) (10.75)
Number of Observations 3888 3888 2448 2448
Number of matching groups 54 54 34 34
Observations per matching group 72 72 72 72
t statistics in parentheses/ * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7.7 Kruskal-Wallis and Pairwise Dunn Tests
Table A9: Success rate and investment behavior
Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise Dunn tests
EL-PRO sessions 0.3 vs. 0.45 0.3 vs 0.6 0.45 vs 0.6
EL 0.001 0.009 0.0009 1
PRO 0.0001 0.0006 0 1
EA-PRO sessions
EA 0.0004 0.197 0.0002 0.0197
PRO 0.0002 0.1635 0.0001 0.0156
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